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Agresta-Richardson: Employee Stock Ownership Plans

"EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS: UNCERTAINTIES PLAGUING THE
DUTIES OF THE ESOP FIDUCIARY WITH RESPECT TO VOTING AND DEFENSIVE

ESOPs"

"Manyforms of conductpermissible in a workaday worldfor those acting
at arm's length, areforbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio ofan honorthe most sensitive, is then the standardof behavior. As to this
there has developed a traditionthatis unbendingand inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitionedto undermine the
rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegratingerosion' of particularexceptions
(Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 444). Only thus has the level of conduct for
fiduciariesbeen kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not
consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court." 1
I. INTRODUCTION

An Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") is a qualified retirement
plan designed to invest primarily in employer stock,2 thus providing plan
participants and their beneficiaries with an ownership interest in their employer.3
As a means to protect employee retirement benefits, Congress enacted the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 4 The ESOP surfaced

Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Justice Cardozo distinguishes the
elevated level of conduct which fiduciaries must exercise with that level of conduct which
parties to an ordinary business transaction must exhibit).
2 I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1998); ERISA § 407(d)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6) (1998).

' William

R. Levin, Note, The False Promise of Worker Capitalism: Congress and the
LeveragedEmployee Stock Ownership Plan,95 YALEL.J. 148, 148 (1985). ERISA defines
an ESOP as "an individual account plan ... which is a stock bonus plan which is qualified,
or a stock bonus plan and money purchase plan both of which are qualified, under section
401 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and which is designed to invest primarily in
qualifying employer securities . . . ." ERISA § 407 (d)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6).
Similarly, the Internal Revenue Code defines an ESOP as "a defined contribution plan...
which is a stock bonus plan which is qualified, or a stock bonus and a money purchase plan
both of which are qualified under section 401 (a) [defined contribution plans] and which are
designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities." I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7).
Additionally, the ESOP must meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 409(h) (repurchase
obligations), I.R.C. § 409(o) (voting requirements of §409(e) for employers holding
registration type securities), and I.R.C. § 409(n) (tax-free rollovers described in I.R.C. §
1042). I.R.C. § 4975 (e)(7)-(8).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974). See also ERISA
FIDUCIARY LAw 203-04 (Susan P. Serota et al. eds., BNA 1995).
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officially with the enactment of ERISA,' yet the idea of such a retirement vehicle
was conceived pre-ERISA.6 Louis 0. Kelso and Senator Russell B. Long
introduced the ESOP and encouraged Congress to adopt it within its ERISA
legislation.' Today, U.S. employers sponsor more than ten thousand ESOPs which
cover over eleven million employees.8
The increased use of ESOPs, particularly in the 1980's with the rise of
corporate mergers and hostile takeovers, 9 made it necessary for federal courts to
interpret ERISA's fiduciary standards as applied to ESOP plan fiduciaries.' ° Unlike
other qualified retirement plans, ESOPs allow its participants to invest in employer
securities." Consequently, ESOP fiduciaries confront significant dilemmas which
other plan fiduciaries do not face. 2 These include valuation issues, employerfiduciary conflicts of interest, the questionable use of defensive ESOPs, and voting
rights.' 3

M. O'Toole, Comment, The DisproportionateEffects of an ESOP's Proportional
Voting, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 824, 824-25 n.3 (1991) (writing that "the overall goal of ERISA
was to strengthen the nation's private pension system"). See also Erza S.Field, Note, Money
5 Matthew

ForNothing and Leverage ForFree: The Politics and History of the LeveragedESOP Tax

Subsidy, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 740,740-41 (1997) (indicating that "ESOPs were an add-on to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ('ERISA'), inserted by Senate
Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long").
6 Levin, supra note 3, at 151 n.l 1, (noting that ESOPs were first discussed in the Regional
Reorganization Act of 1973 which mandated that Conrail, a government-owned railroad,
consider implementing an ESOP). See also Jeffrey R. Gates, A Brief History of U.S. ESOP
Legislation, 3 J. EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP L. & FIN. 34, 40 (1991) (writing about Senator

Long's ideas of "employee capitalism").
' Levin, supra note 3, at 158 (discussing Senator Long's view that a small number of
capitalists weakens the American economy). Levin quotes Senator Long, stating that "[a]
continuing fundamental weakness of our system is that so many Americans own so very little
while a relative few Americans own a great deal." Id. at 158 n.43. See also Gates, supra
note 6, at 36-40 (writing about Senator Long's view that ESOPs will create a more broadly
financed capitalist system).
8John L. Utz, ERISA Basics: A Primeron ERISA Issues (Employee Stock OwnershipPlans),
A.B.A. CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. NAT'L. INSTITUTE (1997) (available in

N97EBAB ABA-LGLED T-1).
9 Growth of Plans ContinuedDuring 1988, NCEO Study Finds, 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No.
32, 1457 (Aug. 7, 1989).
'0 See generally ERISA §§ 403, 404, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103, 1104 (1998) (discussing the
establishment of a trust and fiduciary duties, respectively).

" I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (1998); 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)(1998).
2Donovan

v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467-68 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.

1251(1984). See also ERISA

13 Laurence

FIDUCIARY LAW,

supra note 4.

B. Wohl, Fiduciary Duties Under ERISA: A Tale of Multiple Loyalties, 20 U.
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This article will examine two particular dilemmas that challenge ESOP
fiduciaries: voting rights and the use of defensive ESOPs. First, this article will
discuss the development of ESOPs and their general mechanics. 4 Second, it will
explore the creation of ERISA, including the policy behind the statutory scheme.' 5
It will then set forth ERISA fiduciary law, noting the interplay of ERISA fiduciary
standards and trust law. 16 Third, this article will address problems confronting the
ESOP fiduciary, specifically, voting and tendering shares of ESOP stock and the
effect of using an ESOP as an anti-takeover device.' 7 In doing so, this article will
look not only at how federal courts have interpreted and applied ERISA fiduciary
standards to ESOP fiduciaries, but will also critique the standards which the
Department of Labor have proposed to police this area." Finally, it will suggest
simpler yet more definitive standards than those which the courts and the
Department of Labor have formulated, in an attempt to provide workable guidelines
for ESOP fiduciaries to follow in the exercise of their duties. 19
II. THE DEVELOPING ESOP
A. ESOP Mechanics

An ESOP is a qualified stock bonus plan and/or money purchase plan
designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities,2" and which must

DAYTON L. REV. 43, 44 (1994). See also Eric Grannis, Note, A Problem of Mixed Motives:
Applying Unocalto Defensive ESOPs, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 851, 851 (1992) ("explaining one

area of continuing uncertainty is the judicial supervision of defensive Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOPs)."); Daniel Fischel and John Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105, 1126 (1988) (writing
that "[t]he most visible problem with ERISA's exclusive benefit rule arises from section
408(c)(3), which allows the employer or other plan sponsor to have its own 'officer,
employee, agent, or other representative' serve as trustee or other fiduciary"); Field, supra
note 5, at 758-59 (indicating that when an ESOP overpays for securities, the proceeds used
to
acquire those securities have inured partially to benefit a third party).
14

See infra PART II(A).
'" See infra PART II(B).
16 See infra PART II(B).
'7 See

infra PART III.
See infra PART III.
19See infra PART III.
'8

20

ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code define "qualifying employer security" differently.
The Internal Revenue Code provides a more restrictive definition, and thus, takes precedence
over ERISA's definition. Compare ERISA § 407(d)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(5) (1998) with
I.R.C. § 4975(e)(8) (1998). ERISA § 407(d)(5) identifies a qualifying employer security as

"(A) stock, (B) a marketable obligation (as defined in subsection (e)), or (C) an interest in
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meet the requirements set forth by the Secretary of the Treasury.2 ' Although other
qualified plans may invest in employer stock, these plans may invest only up to
10% of the fair market value of plan assets in employer's securities.22 ERISA
exempts "eligible individual account plans" such as ESOPs, profit-sharing plans,
and stock bonus plans from this requirement and allows their investments to exceed
the 10% limitation.2 3 Unlike most qualified plans, ESOPs are exempt from ERISA's
prohibited transaction rules, 24 and thus may engage in transactions with parties in
interest 2l to the plan, provided the sale or acquisition is for adequate consideration
and no commission is procured with respect to that sale or acquisition.26
Furthermore, provided certain conditions are met, ESOPs are permitted to borrow
money.27

a publicly traded partnership .... but only if such partnership is an existing partnership...

" I.R.C. § 4975(e)(8) defines a "qualifying employer security" as "an employer security
within the meaning of section 409(1)." I.R.C. § 409(1) defines a qualifying employer security
with respect to whether an employer holds publicly tradeable securities. See generallyTreas.
Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(1)(iv)(1977); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8727025 (April 12, 1987); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9529043 (April 28,1995).
21 ERISA §407(d)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6); I.R.C. § 4975 (e)(7)-(8). An ESOP must
comply with the requirements proscribed in Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11 (1977).
22 ERISA § 407(a)(2), (b), (d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2), (b), (d)(3)(A)(1998).
23 id.
2

See infra note 83.

25

ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(1998) defines a "party in interest" to include

fiduciaries, services providers, employers, employee-participants, directors, offers, partners,
joint venturers of the plan, or relatives of the individuals described above.
26 See infra note 84 and accompanying text. The Department of Labor has
attempted to
define "fair market value," central to the definition of adequate consideration, as "the price
at which an asset would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller when the
former is not under any compulsion to buy and the latter is not under any compulsion to sell."

Definition of Adequate Consideration, 53 Fed. Reg. 17,632, 17,634 (1988) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 3510) (proposed May 17, 1988). The Department of Labor's definition of
fair market value requires an ESOP fiduciary to sufficiently justify that the price he or she
accepted for the stock was fair. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 133-34 (1974); see also
Correspondenceon ProposedLeveraged Buy-out of Blue Bell, Inc., 12 Pens. & Ben. Rep.
(BNA) 52 (1985). This differs from the ordinary business definition of "adequate," and thus
is incompatible with ERISA's definition in § 3(21). Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Note, Investment
Bankers' Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96 YALE L.J. 119, 121
(1986) (a price may be adequate, yet not fair). The standard articulated by the Department
of Labor provides little guidance for ESOP fiduciaries and has left them to question the price
they may receive for purchased securities without violating ERISA's prohibited transaction
rules.
27 ERISA § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3)(1998) and I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7)(1998)
(providing that ESOP loans must primarily benefit plan participants and their beneficiaries

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol14/iss1/4
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To establish an ESOP, an employer must execute a trust agreement, setting
forth the plan terms and the rights of the participants and their beneficiaries. 28 The
agreement must functionally designate plan fiduciaries who will manage and
administer the plan.29 Additionally, a trust must be established to hold the plan
assets.3 °
Once created, the ESOP Fiduciary can invest in qualifying employer
securities which may be obtained from a corporate shareholder, directly from the
employer, or if the employer stock is a "section 6" security, on the open market.3 '
Commonly, ESOPs cannot fund a large purchase of stock and must rely on
institutional lenders to supply the capital.32 Often, these lenders are reluctant to
finance such an investment, and thus, the ESOP must rely on a "back-to-back"
ESOP loan such that the employer borrows money from the bank and, in turn, lends
it to the ESOP to finance the securities.3 3 After the stock is purchased, it is placed
in an unallocated expense account, and subsequently, allocated to the plan
participants' accounts as the loan is repaid. ESOPs which use loan proceeds to
purchase qualifying employer securities are known as "leveraged" ESOPs.3 5
The essence of an ESOP is that it is both a qualified employee benefit plan
and a method of corporate finance.36 The legislative goal of establishing ESOPs

and bear a reasonable rate of interest).
U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)(1998).
fiduciaries include plan administrators, plan trustees, and investment
managers.
30 Id. § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1998).

28 ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29
29Id. Examples of such

31

MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 126

(1997). Treas. Reg. § 54.4975.7(b)(1)(iv) states that publicly traded securities are those
registered under § 6 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
32 CANAN, supra note 31.
id.
34 Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(ii)-(iii) (1986); 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-11(d) (1989)
33

(allocation rules); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-7(b)(8)(i)-(iii) (1977) (rules governing the release
of securities from a suspense account).
31 CANAN, supra note 31.
36
Levin, supra note 3, at 148 n.2 "'[Leveraged ESOPs] can be used for financing corporate
growth, tender offers, acquisitions, going private, or increasing the corporations working
capital. Leveraged ESOPs are thought to be especially useful in mergers and divestitures of
subsidiaries and shareholder buy-outs."' Id. J. Kaplan & R. Ludwig, ESOPS A-16 (BNA
Tax Mgmt. Portfolio No. 354-2nd, 1983). See also 129 Cong. Rec. S16, 629, S16, 636
(daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983), wherein, Senator Russell Long suggested "ERISA made it clear
that the ESOP is a technique of corporate finance that utilizes the advantages of a tax-exempt
employee benefit trust to encourage the financing of corporate transactions in such a way that

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999

5

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 14 [1999], Art. 4

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

was to extend corporate ownership to the average worker.37 In support of ESOP
development, Congress introduced tax incentives to those assisting in the formation
of ESOPs.3" Leveraged ESOPs offer the most substantial tax advantages to plan
participants, institutional lenders providing ESOP loans, and corporations which
sponsor these plans.39
First, ESOPs remain the only qualified retirement vehicle permitted to
borrow funds to purchase stock,' both the interest payments on the loan and
payments on the principle are tax deductible.4 1 Interest payments are fully
deducible, but principal payments are treated as employer contributions to the plan
and are deductible only up to 25% of the total compensation of participants covered
under the plan.42
Second, a corporation may qualify for a deduction with respect to dividends
paid on ESOP stock.43 Generally, a corporation may not deduct the dividends it
pays with respect to its stock." However, when certain conditions are met, a

employees will have an opportunity to earn an ownership stake in their employer." Other
reasons suggested for the use of ESOPs include their tax benefits, their use as defensive
measures in takeover contests, and their ability to increase employee productivity. Field,
supra note 5.
31128

Cong. Rec. s33813 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) (emphasizing that ESOPs will enhance
productivity and distribute the wealth). The establishment of the ESOP was a proposed
answer to the inequities present in America's capitalist structure. Id. at s16630. See also
Levin, supra note 3, at 158 (identifying Congressional claims of certain benefits perceived
to emanate from ownership expansion, including "1)new wealth and productivity for the
economy, 2) a chance for workers to accumulate a capital estate; 3) more jobs; .. .7)

preservation of the marginal enterprise ....");But see William Levin, Are Leveraged
Buyouts Fatally Flawed?, WALL ST. J. , Apr. 4, 1985, at 30 "The root problem with
leveraged employee buyouts is the leverage ....Debt doesn't justify a tax bonanza. But

debt of this magnitude does hurt workers, the companies they would own and the economy
as a whole." Id.
3'Tax Reform Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369; Tax Reform Act of 1986, P.L. 99-514 (introducing
tax incentives to lending institutions providing ESOP loans and to employers maintaining
such plans); Tax Management Portfolios, U.S. Income, ESOPs, 354 Tax Mgmt. 5th (BNA)
1 (1997).
3'Levin, supra note 3 at 148 (discussing leveraged ESOPs as a way to create corporate
capital).
40 ERISA § 408(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(3) (1998); I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3) (1998).
41 I.R.C. § 404(a)(9)(1998).
42

Id.

43I.R.C.

§ 404(k)
44I.R.C. § 301(c)(1), § 316.
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corporation can receive a deduction for dividends paid with respect to ESOP
stock.45 Dividends are deducible if they are paid in cash to ESOP participants, if
they are paid to directly to the ESOP, and subsequently, distributed to the plan
participants in cash not more than 90 days after the close of the plan year in which
they were paid, and if they are used to repay an ESOP loan used to acquire the
securities on which the dividends were paid. 46
Third, a leveraged ESOP may provide an advantage to the institution
issuing the loan. Prior to the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Internal
Revenue Code § 133 allowed lending institutions and corporations engaged in the
business of lending money to exclude 50% of the interest it received on the ESOP
loan.47 This exclusion no longer applies to loans made after August 20, 1996.48
However, the exclusion still applies to loans made on or before August 20, 1996 and
loans used to refinance ESOP loans made on or before August 20, 1996, provided
certain conditions are met.49
Fourth, employees who participate in leveraged ESOPs may be allowed
greater annual additions to their individual accounts. Internal Revenue Code § 415
limits annual contributions made to a participant's account by either employee
contributions, employer contributions or forfeitures to the lesser of 25% of
compensation or thirty thousand dollars.5 This limitation is extended for leveraged
ESOPs in which employer contributions to highly compensated employees 51 do not

4' I.R.C.

§ 404(k).

46 Id. Before the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, dividends were deductible only
to the extent the corporation paid them to allocated shares. Utz, supra note 8, at 6. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 permitted dividend deductions on unallocated shares. Id. Corporations
quickly took advantage of this change and began to sell convertible preferred stock which
paid a higher dividend rate than the common stock to the ESOP. Id. The transaction's
beauty was that dividends paid on ESOP stock effectively increased the ESOP loan which
the corporation could finance with tax deducible payments. Id. With the enactment of the
Omnibus Budget-Reconciliation Act of 1989, corporations no longer automatically received
a deduction on dividends used to repay ESOP loans. Id.
4' Rev. Rul. 89-76, 1989-1 C.B. 24; I.R.C. § 133 (repealed in 1996).
48 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1602(c)(1), P.L. 104-188, (codified
as
amended
in
scattered
section
of
26
U.S.C.).
49
Id. Small Business Job Protection Act § 1602(c)(2) delineates certain requirements which
must be met for the interest exclusion to apply. For the interest exclusion to apply: (1) the
loan must meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 133; (2) the principal amount of the loan after
the refinancing must not exceed the principal amount of the loan before the refinancing; and
(3) the term of the refinancing loan must not extend beyond that of the original loan. Id.
50 I.R.C. § 415(c)(1998).
" I.R.C. § 414(q).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999

7

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 14 [1999], Art. 4

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

exceed 1/3 of all employer contributions to the plan.5 2 Under these circumstances,
§ 415 annual contributions will not include forfeitures of employer stock which
have been procured from either the proceeds of an ESOP loan or interest from loan
payments. 3
Finally, Internal Revenue Code § 1042(a) allows a shareholder who sells
"qualified securities"" to an ESOP, and subsequently, acquires "qualified
replacement property"55 either three months before, or twelve months following the
sale of the stock, 56 to defer long-term capital gain recognition on the sale of that
stock until the shareholder sells the qualified replacement property.5 7 For § 1042(a)
to apply, the shareholder must not be a C corporation, 8 must elect the application
of § 1042, and must meet the requirements of § 1042(b). 9
B. ERISA FiduciaryStandardsand the Duties of the ESOP Fiduciary
Congress enacted ERISA as a means of protecting employee retirement
benefits and of monitoring an employer's management of its employee benefit
plans. 60 The heart of ERISA lies in Title I which governs fiduciary conduct,
administration, prohibited transactions, and security requirements. 6' Three distinct
authorities share the responsibility for interpreting Title I and administering the
statute: the federal courts, the Department of Labor, and the Internal Revenue
Service.62 Although the Department of Labor has primary authority to administer
the statute's fiduciary laws, each of these authorities has articulated its own
standards and procedures

52

I.R.C. § 415(c)(6).

53

id.

to govern

employers and fiduciaries63

in the

" I.R.C. § 1042(c)(1); § 409(1) (certain domestic corporation securities).
I.R.C. § 1042(c)(4) (stating that "any security issued by a domestic operation corporation
which (i) did not .... have passive investment income... (ii) is not the corporation which
issued the qualified security which such security is replacing or a member of the same
controlled group of corporations .....
5 I.R.C. § 1042(c)(3).
57I.R.C. § 1042(e)(1) (mandating that the shareholder
recapture any gain deferred on the sale
of qualified securities upon the ultimate disposition of the qualified replacement property).
15

58

I.R.C. § 1042(c)(7).

'9
§ 1042(a).
60 I.R.C.
ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 4, at 3. See also Field, supra note 5, at 744.
61ERISA §§ 2-538, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1168 (1998).
62

ERISA

63

The definition of fiduciary is set forth in ERISA § 3(21), U.S.C. § 1002(2), which states:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan

FIDUCIARY LAW,

supra note 4.
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administration of employee benefit plans. 6 Together, their differing views have
created a perplexing guide for those dealing with pension plans.
One of ERISA's main objectives was the creation of fiduciary obligations
to guide fiduciaries in the management and administration of pension plans.6 5
Congress emphasized:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect
interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure
and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and
other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee
benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions,
and ready access to the Federal courts.6 6
ERISA's fiduciary law is premised on what the Internal Revenue Code refers to as
the "exclusive benefit rule. ' 67 ERISA § 404(a)(1) states:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participantsand beneficiariesand
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries, and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
plan;

or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its
assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or
indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any
authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or
discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan. Such term includes
any person designated under section (405(c)(1)(B)), 1105 (c)(1)(B).
ERISA
§
3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21).
64
JOHN

H. LANGBEIN

& BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAw

80 (2d ed.

1995) (discussing the division of jurisdiction between the Department of Labor and the
Internal Revenue Service as it pertains to the administration of ERISA).
65 Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1463 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1251(1984).
66 ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)(1998). See also Donovan, 716 F.2d at 1463.
67 ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a); I.R.C. § 401(a)(3) (1998).
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(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a
like capacity and familiar with such matter would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to
minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the
circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments
governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments
are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter Im of this chapter.68
Section 404 evidences Congress's intent 69 to adopt traditional notions of trust law
to monitor fiduciary conduct, particularly the duties of care and loyalty which a
trustee owes its beneficiary, 70 and at the same time, to allow for the unique nature

68ERISA

§404(a)( 1), 29 U.S.C. § 11 04(a)(1 )(1 998) (emphasis added). ESOPS are not held
to the strictures of ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), as they are permitted to invest primarily in
employer securities. ERISA § 404(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1 104(a)(2)(1998); See also ERISA §
407(d)(5)-(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(5)-(6).
69

S. REP. No. 93-127, at 29 (1973), reprintedin 1 Legislative History 587, 615. See also S.

REP. NO. 93-127 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4839, 4866; H.R. REP. NO. 93-

1280, at 295 (1976), reprintedin 3 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 4277, 4562; H.R. REP. No. 533, 11, 13, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649,4651.
70 The Eastern District Court of New York described the application of trust principles to
fiduciaries with respect to ERISA:
The legislative history of the [fiduciary duty] sections of ERISA
indicates, that to the extent practical, the obligations of trustees of
pension funds and the limitations on their power of investment were
to be interpreted under principles applicable to trustees under the
common law of trusts, with a view toward establishing uniform
standards.
Marshall v. Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund, 458 F. Supp. 986, 990 (E.D.N.Y.
1978). See also Fischel & Langbein, supranote 13, at 1108 ("The duty of prudent investing,
the duty to diversify investments, and the duty of prudent administration are familiar
standards of trust law."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS

§

174 (prudent administration),

§ 227 (prudent investing), and § 228 (diversification) (1959).
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and character of employee benefit plans.7
The duty of care imposes standards by which courts judge fiduciary
decisions and which mandate that a fiduciary perform his or her duties in good faith,
in the best interests of the beneficiary, with reasonable care, and on an informed
basis.72 Encompassing the duty of care is the "business judgment rule." This
common law rule, now codified in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act,
represents the judicial attitude that courts will abstain from reviewing fiduciary
decisions.73 That is, the rule presumes that directors' decisions are honest and well-

"1ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(1998) (identifying a broader class of fiduciaries);
See also ERISA §§ 421-431, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31(1998) (requiring stricter reporting and
disclosure requirements); ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1998) (prohibited transactions);
ERISA §403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § I 103(c)(1) (providing that plan assets shall not inure to the
benefit of an employer except in explicitly described circumstances).
72 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (articulating the standards of care
required of a fiduciary and predicating director liability upon gross negligence). See also
REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (West Supp. 1997) (codifying the standards
proposed in Aronson). REVISED MODEL BuS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) establishes the general
standard of care for all directors of a corporation. It provides:
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties
as a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the
corporation.
REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP.ACT § 8.30(a).
"3Robert W. Hamilton, Reliance and Liability Standardsfor Outside Directors,24 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 5, 22-23 (1989) (explaining that "[i]n the eyes of most commentators, [the
statutory standard of due care] is aspirational and does not provide the test for directorial
liability. Rather the liability standard is the so-called business judgment rule, which shields
even negligent directors for liability in many circumstances.") See also Joseph Hinsey IV,
Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's CorporateGovernance Project: The
Rule, The Doctrine, and The Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 611 (1984) (discussing
the absence of judicial review of fiduciary decisions contemporaneous with the absence of
liability for those decisions); Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the
Director'sDuty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BuS. LAW. 1477, 1492-1495 (1984)
(noting that "[t]he whole concept of negligence and of 'reasonable man' presupposes as a
predicate a clear conception of what the person is doing, and a community understanding of
a standard of normalcy about how he should do it. Both pieces are missing in the case of the
work of corporate directors."); AMERICAN LAW INST. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (1994) (viewing the business judgment rule as a safe harbor to director
liability).
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intended, rational, and informed.74
Like the duty of care, the duty of loyalty is a significant standard governing
fiduciary conduct.7 The duty of loyalty arises when a director acts on both sides
of a transaction.7 6 The duty of loyalty requires that directors put the interests of the
corporation above their own.77 When a fiduciary's duty of loyalty is questioned,
courts invoke the "entire fairness" test, which requires the fiduciary to demonstrate
the entire fairness of the transaction.7" If a majority of disinterested directors
approve the fiduciary's transaction, the challenging party has the burden of proving
that the fiduciary engaged in unfair dealing at an unfair price.79 Otherwise, the
fiduciary has the burden of proving the transaction was fair."0
In addition to the fiduciary duties delineated in ERISA § 404(a) and those
basic duties espoused by traditional trust law, ERISA § 406 imposes a list of
prohibited transactions.8 Engaging in these transactions is a per se violation of
74

AMERICAN LAW INST. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

§ 4.01 (1994).
Subchapter F, section 8.60-8.63 (amending RMBCA
§ 8.31 to provide a bright-line test for judgment self-dealing transactions).
76 Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921). In Geddes, the United
States Supreme Court reviewed a transaction involving a director of a corporation and the
buying and selling of corporate property for inadequate consideration. The Court stated:
The relation of directors to corporations is of such a fiduciary nature
that transactions between boards having common members are
regarded as jealously by the law as are personal dealings between a
director and his corporation, and where the fairness of such
transactions is challenged the burden is upon those who would
maintain them to show their entire fairness and where a sale is
involved the full adequacy of the consideration. Especially is this true
where a common director is dominating in influence or in character.
This court has been consistently emphatic in the application of this
rule, which, it has declared, is founded in soundest morality, and we
75 REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT,

now add in the soundest business policy.

Id.
at 599.
77
1 d.

See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (stating that the duty of loyalty
requires "the trustee.., to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary"). Cf
ERISA § 404(a)( 1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)( 1)(A)(i)(1998) (requiring that a fiduciary act
"solely in the interest of the beneficiaries and.., for the exclusive purpose of... providing
benefits to the participants and their beneficiaries").
78 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983), on remand to, Weinberger v.

UOP, Inc., 1985 WLl 1546, (Del. Ch. 1985)(No. 5642). affd, 497 A.2d 792 (Del. 1985).
7' Rosenblatt
80

Id.

v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985).

81ERISA § 406,

29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1998). Section 406(1106) provides:
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ERISA.82 However, ERISA exempts ESOP fiduciaries from the strictures of these
rules. 83 ESOP fiduciaries may conduct otherwise prohibited transactions by

(a) Except as provided in section (408)(1108):
(1) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not cause the plan
to engage in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such
transaction constitutes a direct or indirect(A) sale or exchange, or leasing, or any property between
the plan and a party in interest;
(B) lending of money or other extension of credit between
the plan and a party in interest;
(C) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the
plan and a party in interest;
(D) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party in
interest, of any assets of the plan; or
(E) acquisition, on behalf of the plan, of any employer
security or employer real property in violation of section
[407(a)](1 107(a))...
(2) No fiduciary who has authority or discretion to control
or manage the assets of a plan shall permit the plan to hold any
employer security or employer real property if he knows or should
know that holding such security or real property violates section
[407(a)](l 107(a))...
(b) A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not -(1) deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for
his own account,
(2) in his individual or in any other capacity act in any
transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a
party) whose interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the
interests of its participants or beneficiaries, or
(3) receive any consideration for his own personal account
from any party dealing with such plan in connection with a transaction
involving the assets of the plan.
ERISA § 406; 29 U.S.C § 1106.
82 Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d. 523, 529 (3d Cir. 1979).
83 ERISA § 408(e), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(e)(1998) (exempting ESOPs from the prohibited
transactions dealing with the acquisition of employer securities). Section 408(e) states:
(e) Sections [406](1106) and [407](1107) shall not apply to the acquisition
or sale by a plan of qualifying employer securities (as defined in section
[407(d)(5)](1107)(d)(5)) or acquisition, sale or lease by a plan of qualifying
employer real property (as defined in section [407(d)(4)]) 1107(d)(4)-(1) if such acquisition, sale, or lease is for adequate consideration (or in
the case of a marketable obligations, at a price not less factorable to the plan
than the price determined under section [407(e)(1)]) (1107 (e)(1)),
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acquiring employer securities, provided those securities are purchased for "adequate
consideration."8 4 The fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA challenge ESOP
fiduciaries. Although ERISA gives ESOP fiduciaries more flexibility than nonESOP fiduciaries or trustees, their actions are nevertheless, carefully scrutinized
for compliance with ERISA. 85 Fiduciaries of defensive ESOPs 8 6 encounter more
difficult decisions, as they must determine how to vote unallocated shares and must
decide to what extent, if any, to favor management. Often, these fiduciaries play
dual roles as both an ESOP fiduciary and as an officer or director of the corporation

(2) if no commission is charged with respect thereto, and
(3) If-(A) the plan is an eligible individual account plan (as defined in
section [407(e)(3)]) (1107(e)(3)), or
(B) in the case of an acquisition or lease of qualifying employer real
property by a plan which is not an eligible individual account plan, or
of an acquisition or qualifying employer securities by such a plan, the
lease or acquisition is not prohibited by section [407(a)] (1107(a)).
84 ERISA § 3(18), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(18) which provides:
The term "adequate consideration" when used in part 4 of subtitle B
means (A) in the case of a security for which there is a generally
recognized market, either (i) the price of the security prevailing on a
national securities exchange which is registered under section 6 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or (ii) if the security is not traded
on such a national securities exchange, a price not less favorable to
the plan than the offering price for the security as established by the
current bid and asked prices quoted by persons independent of the
issues and of any party in interest; and (B) in the case of an asset
other than a security for which there is a generally recognized market,
the fair market value of the asset as determined in good faith by the
trustee or named fiduciary pursuant to the terms of the plan and in
accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
85CANAN,supra note 31, at 159 (discussing the duties of ESOP trustees). See also H.R. REP.
No. 93-1280, at 133-34 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5186.
86 Defensive ESOPs are ESOPs created as defensive measures in takeover contests.
This
technique puts large amounts of stock in the friendly hands of corporate shareholders (i.e.,
ESOP plan participants). ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 4, at 30. See generally,
Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd inpart,modified inpart,680
F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982) (setting forth standards to
govern ESOPs established in takeover contests). In the late 1980's, ESOPs were extensively
created to thwart corporate takeovers. ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 4, at 33, n.141.
The following companies transferred massive amounts of stocks to ESOPs in 1989: "Proctor
and Gamble, Texaco, J.C. Penney, May Co., Melville Corp., Xerox Corp., McDonalds Corp.,
Colgate-Palmolive, The Travelers Corp., United Technologies, Delta Airlines, Southwestern
Bell, Sara Lee Corp., and Boise Cascade." Id.
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sponsoring the qualified plan.87 This type of "dual motive" situation spurs conflicts
of interest, and the use of an independent fiduciary is often warranted. 8
II. SPECIAL

FIDUCIARY ISSUES

ESOP fiduciaries face a whirlwind of potential conflicts in fulfilling their
fiduciary obligations under ERISA. Most of these conflicts arise in the context of
corporate takeover contests and center around how shares of stock are voted, which
"hat" an employer-fiduciary is donning, and whether an ESOP fiduciary prudently
disposed of employer securities. That is, whether a decision at odds with the plan
document is nevertheless prudent, and whether securities were sold or acquired for
"adequate consideration." These arejust a few issues over which the courts and the
legislatures have struggled and which have left fiduciaries wondering how to
properly execute their fiduciary duties without violating ERISA. This article will
explore in detail two of those issues. First, it will examine the conflicts attending
the voting rights of allocated and unallocated shares of ESOP stock. Second, it will
address the problematic use of ESOPs to thwart hostile corporate takeovers.
A. Voting and Tendering ESOP Stock

The increase of ESOPs has spawned a heightened interest in how ESOP
stock is voted.89 The ESOP fiduciary confronts two main dilemmas with respect to
the voting of ESOP stock; one regarding pass-through or directed voting, and a
second dealing with mirrored or proportional voting. 90 By definition, ESOPs are
stock bonus plans, and therefore, must meet the requirements of Internal Revenue
Code § 401(a), in addition to the requirements set forth in I.R.C. §4975(e)(7). 91
I.R.C. §401 (a)(22) requires that stock bonus plans, including ESOPs, meet the pass-

supra note 31, at 159.
Id. See also Fischel & Langbein, supra note 13, at 1156-57, who stress:

87 CANAN,
88

The severe conflicts of interest that frequently arise when the ESOP
trustees are representatives of management further highlight the
tension between ESOPs and the exclusive benefit rule. In leveraged
buy-outs involving ESOPs ... the ESOP trustees must decide how

much the ESOP should pay for the employer stock. Since the trustees
typically represent (or are themselves) selling shareholders, the
conflict of interest is intense.
89 O'Toole, supra note 5, at 826-828 (writing about the battles surrounding the right to vote
ESOP stock).
90
ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 4, at 204-08 (discussing the statutory voting rights of
shareholders).
91See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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through voting strictures of I.R.C. § 409(e) if the qualified plan has stock which is
not readily tradeable on the open market and which has invested in excess of 10%
of its assets in employer securities.92 Moreover, I.R.C. § 409(e)(5) allows each
participant one vote, with the trustee voting these allocated shares in proportion to
those votes.93 Comparatively, if the ESOP holds registration-type securities,94
participants may vote their allocated shares on all matters requiring a shareholder
vote. 95
1. Duties of the Directed Trustee in Voting Allocated Shares
Voting directed allocated shares is the least problematic voting issue for
ESOP fiduciaries, as I.R.C. § 409(e) sets forth the parameters for voting these
shares. Nonetheless, fiduciaries do struggle somewhat in this area. The legislature
has failed to address the tension between the expansive fiduciary duties of ERISA
§ 404(a)(1) and the confined duties of the directed trustee 96 prescribed in ERISA §
403(a).97 This lack of explanation has caused the Department of Labor and the
courts to interpret ERISA §403(a) differently, and consequently, to weigh fiduciary

92

I.R.C. § 409(e) mandates the participants' right to:
[D]irect the plan as to the manner in which voting rights under
securities of the employer which are allocated to the account of such

participant or beneficiary are to be exercised with respect to any
corporate matter which involves the voting of such shares with respect
to the approval or disapproval of any corporate merger or
consolidation, recapitalization, reclassification, liquidation,
dissolution, sale of substantially all assets of a trade or business, or
such similar transaction as the Secretary may prescribe in regulations.
I.R.C. § 409(e)(3) (allowing votes only on major corporate decisions which does not include
tender offers).
93 I.R.C. § 409(e)(5)(A), (B).
94 I.R.C. § 409(e)(4), Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12 (those securities which
a
corporation must register pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are often

referred to as "Section 12 securities").
9' I.R.C. § 409(e)(2).
A directed trustee is a trustee with limited authority to follow the directions of a "named
fiduciary" who makes certain decisions regarding plan assets pursuant to ERISA §
403(a)(1). Reich v. Nations Bank of Georgia, N.A., 19 E.B.C. (BNA) .1345, 1995 WL
316550 (N.D. Ga. 1995), amended 1995 WL 389614 (1995), rev'd sub nom. Herman v.
Nations Bank Trust Co., 129 F.3d 1354 (11" Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 135 F.3d 1909 (11" h
Cir.
1998). Cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 54 (1998).
97
Colleen E. Medill, The Law of DirectedTrustee UnderERISA: A ProposedBlueprintfor
the Federal Courts, 61 Mo. L. REv. 825, 831 (1996) (noting the difference in judicial
opinion on the duties of the directed trustee).
96
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conduct against varied standards.98

ERISA § 403(a) states:
[T]he trustee or trustees shall have exclusive authority and
discretion to manage and control the assets of the plan, except
to the extent that-(1) the plan expressly provides that the trustee or trustees are
subject to the direction of a named fiduciary who is not a
trustee, in which case the trustees shall be subject to proper
directions of such fiduciary which are made in accordance
with the terms of the plan and which are not contrary to this
Act, or
(2) authority to manage, acquire, or dispose of assets of the
plan is delegated to one or more investment managers pursuant
to section 402(c)(3). 99
When a plan participant directs a trustee on how to vote his or her allocated shares,
the plan participant is considered a "named fiduciary"1"° for such limited purpose."°1
The Department of Labor has noted that this pass-through procedure may be
followed if the named fiduciary's directions do not violate ERISA or conflict with
the plan terms, and provided that a fiduciary follow guidelines to ensure that a
participant's vote is cast independently and without coercion. 10 2 Such guidelines
include providing a participant with adequate information about the matter on which
he or she is to vote, withholding from a participant any information which is likely
to be misleading, allowing a participant sufficient time to render a decision,
inquiring as to delayed responses, and assuring full confidentiality of a participant's
decision. 1°3

98

Id. at 833 (recognizing that "[t]he root of the problem ... no guidance in the statute as to

what constitutes a 'proper' direction... [N]o guidance.., concerning to what lengths the
directed trustee must go to ascertain whether the direction is in accordance with the terms of
the plan and ERISA.").
99 ERISA § 403(a)(l)-(2), 29 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1)-(2) (1998).
"0oERISA § 402(a)(2), § 1102(a)(2).
101 DOL Opinion Letter on Tender Offers, 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 390 (Feb.23, 1989).
102 Id. See also DOL Advisory Opinion on Fiduciary Responsibility in Connection with
Attempted CorporateTakeovers, 11 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 633 (Apr. 30, 1984).
103 John S. Welsh, Fiduciary Aspects of Employee Stock Ownership Plan Investments in
Employer Securities, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 575, 594-95 (1988) (discussing the
Department of Labor's suggested safeguards to assist fiduciaries with pass-through voting).
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Early case law which reviewed the duties of directed trustees introduced
several fundamental principles.104 First, the cases recognized that directed trustees
were fiduciaries under ERISA, and subject to ERISA fiduciary law.1" 5 Second,
where a plan fiduciary gave a direction, the directed trustee could accept that
direction without further inquiry provided the direction facially complied with the
of ERISA §
plan terms, and did not violate ERISA. 10 6 That is, the specific duties
10 7
403(a) override those general duties outlined in ERISA § 404(a).
Recent case law has confused the fundamental policies which the early
cases have established. The court in FirsTierBank, N.A. v. Zeller,'0 8 imposed the
duty of independent inquiry upon a directed trustee when given a direction by
another fiduciary, but not when a trust beneficiary gave such direction.'0 9 This strict
application of common trust law not only skews ERISA's functional scheme in the
delegation of duties among fiduciaries, but it removes the extra protection which
most plan participants need."0
Elevating the confusion is the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals division in
Manice v. Commerce Bank," 1'which reviewed the conduct of a directed trustee after
receiving directions from an ESOP committee regarding the acquisition and sale of
the employer's securities. 112 Ignoring ERISA § 3(21)(A)(i), which discusses
fiduciary duties involving the management and disposition of plan assets, the court
determined that the directed trustee was not a fiduciary under ERISA § 3(21)(A)(i),

See also DOL Information Letter, 22 Pen. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2249 (Sept. 28, 1995).
"04Medill, supra note 97, at 840. See also Newton v. Van Otterloo, 756 F. Supp. 1121,
1132-33 (N.D. Ind. 1991); Ershick v.United Missouri Bank, 948 F.2d 660,667-68 (10th Cir.
1991).
105 Id.
106 id.

107
id.
"0 FirsTier

Bank, N.A. v. Zeller, 16 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1994), reh.g, en banc, denied, 1994

U.S. App. Lexis 7817 (8th Cir. Apr. 18, 1994), cert. denied sub nom., Vencoe v. FirsTier
Bank, N.A., 513 U.S. 871 (1994).
"'o
Id. at 911 (explaining that "an ERISA trustee who deals with plan assets in accordance

with proper directions of another fiduciary is not relieved of its fiduciary duties to conform
to the prudent man standard of care ....)
"oMedill, supra note 97, at 847 (stating that "[s]uch a rule provides no protection to the plan
participants in situations where they are potentially vulnerable to coercion by their employer

who sponsors the plan. This danger is particularly acute when the plan holds as an asset
shares of company stock.").
"' Manice v. Commerce Bank, 40 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1994), reh'g, en banc, denied, 1994
U.S. App. Lexis 36045 (8th Cir. Dec. 19, 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1111 (1995).
112

Id. at 265-66.
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as it exercised no discretion as to the sale or purchase of the stock.'13 The effect of
this decision is to place significant burdens on plan participants who are injured as
114
a result of the conduct of a directed trustee and to leave them without a remedy.
The case law discussed above and the Department of Labor's interpretation
of directed trustees' duties under ERISA suggest that ERISA § 403(a)(1) has two
possible meanings." 5 Earlier case law suggested that the phrase "proper
directions," incident to § 403(a)(1), means that a directed trustee may passively
follow a direction of a plan fiduciary if that direction, on its face, complies with
ERISA. 16 However, more recent case law, particularly FirsTierBank, emphasized
that a direction given by another fiduciary is proper only if the directed trustee
independently inquires of and investigates the direction to ensure that his or her17
ultimate decision to follow such direction comports with ERISA fiduciary law.
Contrarily, FirsTiersuggests that when a direction is given by a plan participant,
the directed trustee need not independently review the decision."'
This article is primarily concerned with a directed trustee's duty in relation
to a plan participant. Unlike the Eighth Circuit's approach in FirsTierBank, the
Department of Labor finds a directed trustee's duty of independent inquiry
imperative in the context of participant-directed voting." 9 Unfortunately, the

Id. at 267. But see, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5075, 5079, 5082-83 (writing about the duties of directed trustees and
their fiduciary responsibilities); FirsTierBank 16 F.3d at 911 (holding that the directed
trustee was a fiduciary under ERISA § 3(21)(A)(i)). The court noted that "[T]his section
imposes fiduciary duties not only if one exercises discretionary authority or control over plan
management, but imposes those duties whenever one deals with plan assets." Id.
114 Medill, supra note 97, at 846 (discussing the effect of defining the directed trustee as a
nonfiduciary).
113

115
116

Id.

117

FirsTierBank, 16 F.3d at 911.
1d. But see, e.g., Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 635 F. Supp. 246, 249

Id. at 851-852. See also Newton v. Van Otterloo, 756 F. Supp. at 1132-33; Ershick v.
United Missouri Bank, 948 F.2d at 667-68.
8

(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (expressing a belief that "it would be inappropriate (and perhaps a breach
of fiduciary obligation) for a trustee to put aside his personal judgment in favor of carrying
out the wishes of the CP plan participants."); Martin v. NationsBank of Georgia, N.A., 16
E.B.C. (BNA) 2138, 1993 WL 345606 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (stressing that it is inappropriate for
a trustee to follow a participant's direction where merely following that direction conflicts
with the trustees' fiduciary duties under ERISA).
DOL Information Letter, 22 Pen. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 2249 (Sept. 28, 1995). See also
DOL Letter re: Profit Sharing Planfor Employees of CarterHawley Hal Stores, Inc. 11
119

Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 633 (April 30, 1984) [hereinafter Carter Hawley Letter]
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Department of Labor does not approach participant-directed loans as it does
participant-directed voting, which adds even more confusion to this area of the
law. 120 With respect to participant-directed votes, the Department of Labor has
adopted a position similar to the earlier case law discussed above, which imposes
a duty of independent inquiry on a directed trustee only if the directed trustee had
2
actual knowledge of coercion or if the decision on its face is contrary to ERISA.1 1
As for the participant-directed investments, the Department of Labor has taken the
middle ground, and looks to whether the participant exercised independent control
in choosing the investment, but fails to suggest that the directed trustee has 22
a duty
of inquiry to determine if the participant's decision was truly independent.1
The federal courts and the Department of Labor have established
inconsistent standards to guide directed trustees. Most likely, their purpose in
developing these standards was to safeguard the rights of plan participants without
violating ERISA. However, these purposes are ill-served because of their
inconsistency. The federal courts have strictly applied standards of trust law,' 23
while the Department of Labor applies a facts and circumstances test, looking to the
type of direction which the participant is giving, and specifying a standard based on

(emphasizing the necessity for safeguarding a plan participant's right to independently vote
his or her shares); CANAN, supra note 31, at 134 n.6 ([P]ass-through voting for allocated
shares permissible as long as plan trustee ensures that participants have made a proper
decision under ERISA, i.e., that necessary information was provided to participants, that
clearly false or misleading information was not distributed to participants, and that the
participants were not subjected to pressure from the employer to vote their shares in a
particular manner.... ); Medill, supra note 97, at 856-57, wherein, Medill states:
[U]nder the common law of trusts, the directed trustee was not
required to independently investigate a facially valid direction made
by a trust beneficiary solely for his own behalf. In the context of an
ESOP with participant-directed voting, each participant directs the
trustees solely with respect to the shares held in his own ESOP
account, a situation similar to where a trust beneficiary directs the
trustee solely for his own benefit. Therefore, under a strict
application of the common law of trusts, the directed trustee of the
ESOP would not be required to look behind the facially valid voting
directions of the ESOP participants to determine the fairness of the
voting procedures.
Id.

120 29

C.F.R. § 2550.408b-l(a)(4), Example (3) (1995).

id.
122 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(2).
123 FirsTierBank, 16 F.3d at 911.
121
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that particular direction.' 24 If a directed trustee accepts a participant-directed vote
which is facially valid without further inquiry, under federal law, the trustee has not
violated his or her ERISA duties. However, under the Department of Labor's
standard, the directed trustee has violated ERISA, as he or she has failed to perform
an independent inquiry of the participant's direction.
Unfortunately, legislative history provides little guidance for resolving this
conflict.'2 5 A simple answer would be to refashion the standards devised by the
Department of Labor. Eliminating a facts and circumstances test and applying a
clear, bright-line standard to all participant-directed issues, whether they concern
voting, investments, or loans, would provide directed trustees with greater guidance
in their affairs. 26 Although this added responsibility would be more costly to
administer, the lack of ambiguity for trustees coupled with the safeguards it
27
provides to plan participants, far outweigh the added administrative costs. 1

2. Voting Unallocated Shares
Normally, leveraged ESOPs allocate only a small amount of their purchased
stock to their participants. 28 The additional shares are placed in a suspense
account and allocated to participants as the ESOP repays its loan.' 2 9 Commonly,
ESOP plan documents provide for "mirrored voting."' 3 That is, they allow trustees

124 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-l(a)(4), Example (3) (1995); § 2550.404c-1(c)(2).
125 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5082-83

(discussing the duties of the directed trustee with respect to directions by plan fiduciaries, but
failing to discuss participant-directed issues).
126 But see Medill, supra note 97, at 864 (stating that "[i]n other situations, such as
participant-directed plan loans or participant-directed investments, the elaborate procedures
governing the participant's directions under ERISA arguably provide sufficient protection to
the participants so that imposing a duty of independent inquiry upon the directed trustee is
unnecessary.").
127 In Varity Corp. v. Howe, the Supreme Court indicated that employee benefit plans which
are costly to administer may deter an employer from implementing such plans. Howe, 516
U.S. 489, 494 (1996). Although this is true, blurred fiduciary standards likely will
discourage individuals from becoming plan fiduciaries for fear of liability with each decision
that they make.
128 CANAN, supra note 31, at 134.
129
id.

O'Toole, supra note 5, at 828 (describing four ways that unallocated shares may be
apportioned: (1)the trustee can independently vote or tender the unallocated shares; (2) a
committee may vote or tender the unallocated shares; (3) the trustee can vote or tender the
unallocated shares proportionate to participants votes on allocated shares; or (4) participants
can specifically direct their vote on both their allocated and a proportion of the unallocated
130
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to vote unallocated shares and nonvoted allocated shares in proportion to how the
participants voted their allocated shares.'
Leveraged ESOPs, which require
mirrored voting, are great tools to defend against corporate takeovers, for they put
large blocks of stocks in corporate friendly hands. 3 ' Nonetheless, mirrored voting
has sparked controversy between the courts and the Department of Labor, as both
have questioned whether mirrored voting violates the fiduciary principles of
ERISA.'33
The Department of Labor has expressed reservations about mirrored
voting.' Its view is that a trustee has a duty to exercise his or her discretion on
how unallocated shares are voted, and therefore, must independently vote those
shares unless he or she finds that mirrored voting would be prudent under the
particular circumstances. 135 The Department of Labor has opined that voting with
shares).
131Grannis,

supra note 13, at 863-64 (writing about the necessity of a mirrored voting

provision in an ESOP plan so as not to interfere with the protection afforded by the Delaware
takeover statute). Grannis discusses the importance of the Delaware takeover statute,
codified DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 403, explaining:
This law prohibits a prospective acquiror of a corporation from
engaging in any business combination with the target corporation for
three years after becoming an 'interested shareholder' (a party owning
at least fifteen percent of the stock) unless the acquiror obtains at least
eighty-five percent of the voting stock of the target company in the
same transaction that causes it to become an interested shareholder.
This provision can increase the difficulty of mounting a takeover. An
acquiror cannot 'creep' beyond fifteen percent and therefore must
acquire at least seventy percent of the company at the premium price
of the tender offer. But in order for the shares in the ESOP to be
considered 'outstanding,' employees must have the 'right to determine
confidentially whether shares held subject to the plan will be
tendered.' Mirrored voting provisions provide this right and thus
fulfill the statute's requirements.
Id.
32
' Id. See also Letterfrom Alan Lebowiz, U.S. Dep'tofLabor, Office of Pensionand Welfare
Benefits Program,to the SecuritiesandExchange Commission (Jan. 30, 1985)(writing about
the proposed ESOP of Phillips Petroleum to ward off T. Boone Pickens's takeover threat).
133 Id. See also Grannis, supra note 13, at 864 n.91 (stating that "the Department of Labor
has opined that ERISA requires the ESOP trustee to make an independent fiduciary decision
as to how the unallocated shares should be voted and tendered... This creates a conflict
between the requirements of the Delaware anti-takeover law and federal regulations that has
not been resolved.").
134 CANAN, supra note 31, at 135.
131 Carter Hawley Letter, supra note 119. See also Letter from Alan Lebowitz, Deputy
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respect to unallocated shares is the "exclusive responsibility of the Plan trustee" and
that this duty overrides any plan provisions requiring mirrored voting.136
Furthermore, the Department of Labor acknowledged that plan assets include the
right to vote stock, thus, dictating that as part of a trustee's duty to manage plan
37
assets, the trustee must vote unallocated stock.
One court has expressed a view similar to the Department of Labor with
regard to mirrored voting. In Danaher Corporationv. Chicago Pneumatic Toll
Company, 138 the court reviewed whether it was permissible for a company to
transfer one million shares of stock to its ESOP and then allow the trustee to vote
the unallocated shares in proportion to the allocated votes of the participantemployees.' 39 Chicago Pneumatic argued that the trustee had a duty to protect the
employees of the corporation, and the best way to do this was to allow the trustee
to utilize the proportional voting provision of the benefit plan. 10 The court rejected
this argument and held:
It therefore appears that the trustees must discharge their duties by
evaluating the best interests of beneficiaries in the abstract as
beneficiaries. The duty cannot be discharged simply by consulting
and carrying out the expressed wishes of those whose present
position makes them the presumptive beneficiaries. To do so
would be as inappropriate as voting in deference to the expressed
wishes of those Danaher employees who are likely to succeed to
participating positions if Danaher's takeover attempt succeeds. 14'
The court reasoned that the participants had no vested right to participate in future
allocations, as their participant status was contingent on their employment, and that
present participants had no right to vote on issues which would benefit future
beneficiaries 142

Assistant Secretary for Program Operations, DOL, to ESOP Trustee (Feb. 23, 1989),

reprintedin 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, 391 (Mar. 6, 1989).
136 Id.
137 Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101 (1989).
138 Danaher Corporation v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company, 635 F. Supp. 246, 249
(1986).
139 Id. at 247, 249.
"4 Id. at 249 (In a letter to the court, the company urged, "'[I]t is legal under ERISA ... to
pass the vote through directly to the employees.., there is no more representative group than
the present employees of the interests of all CP employees, present and future."').
141 Id. at 250.
142 Id. at 249-50.
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A year later, the court for the Southern District of New York espoused a
different view regarding mirrored voting. In British Printing & Communication
Corp. v. HarcourtBrace Jovanovich,Inc., 14' a target corporation transferred a large
block of stock to its ESOP in an attempt to thwart a corporate takeover. The court
reviewed whether the trustee could proportionally vote the unallocated shares and
summarily held that he could, provided he acted in the best interests of the ESOP
beneficiaries.' 44
Two distinct and contradicting views exist concerning the appropriate
standard for ESOP trustees when voting unallocated shares of employer stock. The
issue remains unresolved, although the Department of Labor has retreated
somewhat from its firm position against mirrored voting. 4 5 The Department of
Labor has issued two letters which suggest that it is appropriate for a trustee to
proportionally vote unallocated shares.'4 6 In a 1989 letter, the Department of Labor
opined that a trustee could follow a mirrored voting provision if it was prudent and
in the best interests of the plan participants. 47 Subsequently, in a 1995 letter, the
Department of Labor curtailed its position even further, noting that a trustee should
follow a plan document specifying proportional voting, unless doing so would be
imprudent.'
Thus, it appears that the Department of Labor has taken a lenient
approach to mirrored voting, similar to the court in British Printing.

British Printing & Communication Corp. v.Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 664 F. Supp.
1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
144d. at 1528-29.
145 CANAN, supra note 31, at
135.
" DOL Opinion Letter on Tender Offers, February 23, 1989, reprintedin, 16 Pen. Rep.
(BNA) 390 (March 6, 1989) [hereinafter PolaroidLetter] ;DOL InformationLetter re: Pass113

through Voting Provisions in Collectively BargainedEmployee Stock Ownership Plans,to

Jan D. Lanoff on behalfofAFL-CIO, (September 29, 1995) [hereinafter AFL-CIO Letter].
...
PolaroidLetter in which the Department of Labor stated:
[T]o the extent, however, that those Plan provisions instruct the
trustee ... concerning the method by which he shall tender ...
unallocated or non-voted allocated stock ... the Plan trustee may
follow such Plan provisions only to the extent.., consistent with the
provisions of title I and IV of ERISA. Thus... Plan trustees, must
determine, among other things, whether following such provisions
would be prudent for the plan and would produce a result which
would be for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to the plan
participants and beneficiaries.
PolaroidLetter, supra note 146.
14' AFL-CIO Letter, supra note 146 (noting that a trustee may not
ignore a Plan's passthrough voting provisions, and in doing so, has the burden to show that following them would
be imprudent).
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Notwithstanding the Department of Labor's position, in 1995, the Northern
District Court of Georgia issued an opinion which implied that mirrored voting was
impermissible and contrary to ERISA.149 In Reich v. NationsBank of Georgia, the
issue concerned the standard of care owed participants with respect to the tender of
unallocated and nonvoted shares.' 50 The case arose in the shadow of a takeover
contest between Polaroid Corporation and Shamrock Acquisitions Il, Inc..
In 1988, Polaroid Corporation ("Polaroid") established a partially leveraged
ESOP, appointing NationsBank as the ESOP trustee.' The ESOP purchased 300
million shares of stock from Polaroid, allocating approximately 15 million shares
to the participants' individual accounts.' 52 Over 90% of the ESOP shares remained
unallocated. 5 3 The Polaroid Employee Stock Equity Plan (the "Plan") delineated
three provisions to govern the ESOP in the event of a tender offer. The first was a
pass-through provision which provided that participants could direct the trustee in
tendering their allocated stock. Second, the Plan incorporated an instruction
provision which required participants to specifically direct their allocated shares in
order for the trustee to tender them. Finally, the Plan had a mirrored provision
which permitted the trustee to tender unallocated shares in proportion to allocated
shares. "'
Soon after Polaroid established its ESOP, Shamrock Acquisitions III, Inc.
("Shamrock") filed suit to enjoin the ESOP and asked to negotiate the acquisition
of Polaroid.155 Polaroid rejected, and Shamrock initiated a tender offer, offering
forty-five dollars per share for Polaroid's stock. 56 In response, Polaroid
commenced a self-tender, offering fifty dollars per share for its stock.'57 The trustee
tendered only the participant-directed allocated shares to Polaroid, leaving the other
unallocated and nonvoted shares untouched. 5 The United States Secretary of Labor
brought suit against the ESOP trustee claiming that it violated its ERISA fiduciary

9 Reich v. NationsBank of Georgia, N.A., 19 E.B.C. (BNA) 1345, 1995 WL 316550 (N.D.
Ga. 1995), amended 1995 WL 389614 (1995), rev'd sub nom. Herman v. Nations Bank
Trust Co., 129 F.3d 1354 (11 " Cir. 1997) reh 'g denied, 135 F.3d 1409 (11 t' Cir. 1998) cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 54 (1998).
150 Id. at *8.
' Id. at *1
...
Id. at *1-2.
"

153 Id.
'14

Reich, 1995 WL 316550 at *2.

155 Id.

156

Id. at *3.

157

Id.

158

id.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1999

25

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 14 [1999], Art. 4

116

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

duties of prudence and loyalty under § 404(a)(1)(A) and (B). 159
The court held that trustees must act prudently and in the best interests of
the participants and their beneficiaries. 160 The court relied on Danaher,stating:
[A]lthough the opinion in Danaheris dicta, the court made a wellreasoned analysis ...
Although ERISA § 403(a) expressly provides
that a trustee is subject to the direction of a 'named fiduciary,' this
can only occur when it is not contrary to ERISA. In this court's
view, allowing present participants, who have an immediate
conflict of interest, to act as 'named fiduciaries' of unallocted
shares is contrary to ERISA. There is simply no way to ensure that
present participants will make tender decisions that are in the best
interests of all participants who will benefit from the plan in the
future, without requiring a trustee to exercise independent
judgment.

161

Moreover, the court reasoned that I.R.C. § 409(e) requires that a court sanction only
pass-through voting on allocated shares held by ESOPs of publicly held
corporations. 62 The court emphasized that because I.R.C. § 409(e)(5) makes no
distinction between allocated and unallocated shares, the court can reasonably infer
that Congress intended I.R.C. § 409(e) to apply only to allocated shares, which are
referenced in I.R.C. § 409(e)(2) and (3). 63
The earlier opinions of the Department of Labor and the decisions of the
Danaher and Reich courts present strong arguments against mirrored voting
provisions in ESOP plans. 164 The best solution to untangling the divergent views

Reich, 1995 WL 316550 at *4-5.
Id.at *13.
161 Id. at *16.
162 id.
163 Id. at *17. The court noted, "[I]t would appear that Congress has only recognized and
159

16 0

approved mirrored voting provisions in certain circumstances. These circumstances are when
an ESOP: 1) falls under Section 409(e)(3), where the employer does not have a registrationtype class of securities, and 2) provides for apportioning its votes on a one person, one vote
basis." Id.
164 But see O'Toole, supra note 5, at 844. O'Toole notes:
[M]any practitioners claim that Congress's primary purpose in
favoring ESOPs was to create tools of corporate finance, which
simultaneously broadened capital ownership for employees by
allowing them to have input in shareholder decisions. Consequently,
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of the Department of Labor and of the courts is to implement a bright-line standard
requiring that fiduciaries independently inquire into votes on all shares, allocated
or unallocated. This standard would protect fiduciaries, regardless of whether they
had exclusive authority to manage the plan assets or had to follow the directions of
a "named fiduciary." This standard of care would accomplish numerous objectives.
First, it would assure that plan participants are protected, in that fiduciaries
would be required to evaluate whether a participant has independently voted his or
her allocated shares or whether that participant has been coerced and/or
misinformed, and therefore, has compromised his or her vote to the whim of
management. 165 Second, it would more effectively guide fiduciaries in their duties
to exclusively benefit plan participants and their beneficiaries. 166 No longer would
fiduciaries be subjected to diverse standards based on whether the shares tendered
were allocated, or unallocted. One clear standard would govern all fiduciaries,
making it easier for them to perform their jobs and to determine the best interests
of both present participants and future beneficiaries. 67 Moreover, a clear standard
would provide incentives for individuals to act as fiduciaries without the constant
fear of liability. In effect, this would allow fiduciaries to administer ESOPs and

manage plan assets more efficiently and would benefit all involved. 68
Rather than issue periodic letters which continuously undermine its position
on voting, the Department of Labor should implement a regulation which
establishes firm safeguards across the board to guide all fiduciaries on all matters
of voting. This would ensure that all fiduciaries understand that they have a

they argue that not allowing participants to vote unallocated shares in
proportion to their allocated shares severely limits this purpose.
Id.
O'Toole writes, "[t]he proportional voting provision violates ERISA because it permits
self-dealing and imprudent administration of plan assets, actions that are not in the sole
interests of participants and beneficiaries." Id. at 851.
166 Donovan v. Bierwirth, 538 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ordermodified by 680 F.2d 263
(2 nd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982) (explaining that "although a trustee may
have dual loyalties, when acting on behalf of the fund, his primary loyalty to the fund is the
only loyalty which may affect his judgment.").
167 Danaher, 635 F. Supp. at 250 (1986) (stressing that present participants have no interest
in benefitting those other than themselves, and thus, should not vote on issues benefitting
future participants).
168 But see O'Toole, supra note 5, at 865 n.210. "It is also true that requiring a trustee's
independent voting may generate some additional costs ('inefficiencies') ... Of course a
trustee will probably raise the fees that it charges to administer the plan. These extra fees
surely will be paid out of... the pockets of the plan participants and beneficiaries." Id. Cf
Easterbrook & Fischel, CorporateControl Transactions,91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982).
165
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heightened duty of care, that of the prudent expert pursuant to ERISA
§404(a)(1)(B). This standard would require that fiduciaries independently evaluate
directed votes and independently vote unallocated or nonvoted shares rather than
pass this responsibility on to plan participants who may not vote in the best interests
of future beneficiaries, and may not take169into consideration the business exigencies,
stability, and future of their employer.
B. ESOPs as a Defensive Measure in CorporateTakeover Contests
1. ESOPs As Anti-Takeover Devices
The 1980's proved to be a decade of change for corporate America.
Takeovers dominated the arena, as hostile mergers" 7 turned companies inside-out
72
and left many without jobs. 7 ' The ESOP was an intricate part of this battle.1
Aside from being a tool of corporate finance, the ESOP is also often used as a
strategic anti-takeover device.' 73
Leveraged ESOPs with mirrored voting
provisions are quite effective in thwarting takeovers because they can acquire large
blocks of stock at once and place a substantial number of shares in "friendly
74
hands." 1
The increased use of ESOPs as defense mechanisms has created a need for
heightened judicial scrutiny. 75 Fiduciaries owe a duty of care and loyalty to the
corporation and its shareholders. 7' 6 Yet, unlike traditional trust law which prohibits

169

Joint Department of Labor/Departmentof Treasury Statement of Pension Investments,

16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 215 (Feb. 6, 1989) (encouraging trustees to consider long-terms effects
of employer's business operations).
170 In a hostile takeover, the potential acquiror by-passes management and directly appeals
to the target company's shareholders. SOLOMON, ET AL., CORPORATIONS, LAW AND POLICY,
MATERIAL AND PROBLEMS 1172 (3d ed. 1994).
171 Grannis, supra note 13, at
851.
172
Id.

O'Toole, supra note 5, at 837-38.
management's expectation that employees vote against potential acquiror).
See also Nassau, Schwartz & Sobel, ESOPs after Polaroid-- Opportunitiesand Pitfalls, 15
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 347, 348 (1989) (explaining that "[e]mployees are perceived to be more
concerned with the immediate benefits of job security than with the potential increase in the
value of their future retirement benefits that will result from tendering their ESOP shares to
a hostile acquiror.").
7' Grannis, supra
note 13, at 851-52 (discussing judicial supervision of defensive ESOPs and
the task judges have untangling the intertwining business and defensive purposes of these
mechanisms).
176 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
173

174 Id. (discussing
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a trustee from holding positions of interest and acting as a fiduciary with respect to
those positions, ERISA allows fiduciaries to wear two hats.177 Often, corporate
directors and officers act as both fiduciaries and members of management.178 These
dual loyalties create conflicts of interest. Commonly, a corporation will create an
ESOP shortly before or at the onset of a tender offer, as it knows management will
control the right to vote and tender the majority of its stock, especially when the
ESOP's plan document permits mirrored voting. 179 Close judicial supervision of the
circumstances surrounding an ESOP's creation and the transactions
contemporaneous with it is necessary to determine a fiduciary's true motive. is
However, assessing whether a fiduciary has acted out of personal interest or in the
interests of plan beneficiaries is often a difficult task -- so difficult that courts have
been unable to agree on whether an ESOP established in the midst of a tender offer
shall be upheld. 8 '
2. The Unocal Analysis
Generally, a court will review a fiduciary's decisions against the business
judgment rule. 182 However, in cases involving hostile takeovers, courts employ a
stricter standard of review. 8 3 In Unocal v. Mesa, 184 the Delaware Supreme Court
developed a heightened standard for evaluating a director's decision to employ

177 Wohl, supra note 13 at 47 (comparing fiduciary principles of traditional trust law with
those of ERISA).
178

Id. "Once a position of dual loyalties is sanctioned ....

it can be very difficult to

determine: (1) if a fiduciary has stepped over the line and breached his or her duty of loyalty
to the plan beneficiaries... ; or (2) if the fiduciary has merely made a mistake in judgment
or simply made a reasonable investment or take a reasonable act which did not turn out as
intended .. " Id.
"' O'Toole, supra note 5, at 838 n.81 (noting that "[p]erhaps the proportional voting could
be viewed as the major ESOP mechanism that 'stacks the ESOP deck' in favor of
management.").
180 A fiduciary breaches its duties under ERISA when his or her decisions are motivated by
personal interest rather than by the best interests of the plan participants and their
beneficiaries. See Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 364 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,sub nom.
Engle v. Estate of Johnson, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989). See also Grannis, supra note 13, at 854
(noting that " [t]he courts have long recognized that directors taking defensive actions might
be acting not in the interests of shareholders but to maintain their own positions.").
181CANAN, supra note 31, at 163-64 (discussing varied court opinions which reviewed the
creation of defensive ESOPs).
182 See supra, notes 72 and 73.
183 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
184 Id. at 954.
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certain defensive measures against hostile takeovers. 8 5 The court announced that
because of the "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests, rather than those of the corporation or its shareholders," 186 the court had
a duty to examine a director's conduct prior to invoking the business judgment
rule.8 7 The court reaffirmed the standard set forth in Cheff v. Mathes,188 noting that
directors must show that they had a reasonable belief that the prospective takeover
threatened corporate policy and effectiveness. 189 However, the court stressed that
the Cheff standard was just part of the inquiry, holding:
If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business
judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
This entails an analysis by the directors of the nature of the
takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise.19
The Unocal decision represents the willingness of courts to implement an
intermediate standard of review and examine the substance of a director's decision
to implement a defensive measure when faced by a hostile takeover before allowing
such director the protection of the business judgment rule.19 '
3. After Unocal
Although the Unocal decision has provided courts with some guidance in
evaluating a corporation's decision to implement an anti-takeover measure, like an
ESOP,'92 a clear standard for determining whether defensive ESOPs will be upheld
185 Id. at
16
1 Id. at

955-56.
954.
187 Id. The court stated:
We must bear in mind the inherent danger in the purchase of shares
with corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate policy when a
threat to control is involved. The directors are of necessity
confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is
difficult.
Id. at 955 (quoting Bennett v. Propp. Del. Supr., 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962)).
188 Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964).
189 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (Del. 1985).
'90 Id. at 954.
191The intermediate standard of review is a compromise between the entire fairness test and
the business judgment rule. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d
103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986). See also Grannis, supranote 13, at 856 (explaining that "Unocal
seemed to recognize more frankly the self interest of management, and thus to encourage
courts to view management decisions more skeptically.").
192 Other defensive mechanisms include poison pills, issuing large cash dividends, corporate
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has yet to be established. 193 Decisions such as Shamrock Holdings 94 and NCR
Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,'9 although inconsistent in their
analytical approach to defensive ESOPs, have supplied some answers to this
perplexing issue. Central to this article's analysis are the factors each court
considered in either upholding or invalidating the ESOP at issue in each case.
In Shamrock Holdings,the Delaware Chancery Court reviewed Shamrock's
claim that Polaroid's directors breached their fiduciary duties by establishing the
Polaroid ESOP. Shamrock claimed that Polaroid's directors were not only
misinformed and uninformed but failed to follow the test employed in Unocal.
However, the court disagreed and upheld the validity of the ESOP, noting the
overall fairness of the plan. 196 The court reasoned that the business judgment rule
may still be applied, provided the Unocal standard is met first.' 97 The court looked
to four main factors in determining the fairness of Polaroid's ESOP: (1) whether the
ESOP was "shareholder neutral"; 198 (2) the ESOP's business purpose;'99 (3) the
ESOP's defensive purpose; 200 and (4) the ESOP's dilutive effect. 2 1' The court found
that the ESOP was shareholder neutral, as the plan was funded in part with a 5%
employee paycut. °2 Furthermore, the court emphasized the evidence of improved
productivity. 2 3 The court then analyzed the anti-takeover effect of the ESOP,

restructuring, share repurchases and greenmail, and defensive mergers. SOLOMON, supra

note 171, at 1204-12.
193
194

ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 4, at 209.
Shamrock Holdings, 559 A.2d 257.

'9'

NCR Corp. v. American Tele. and Tele. Co., 761 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ohio 1991).

Shamrock, 559 A.2d at 276.
Id. at 269-70. The court stated that "the directors must establish 'reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed' and the defensive
measure chose by the board must be 'reasonable in relations to the threat posed." (citations
omitted).
19' Whether an ESOP is "shareholder neutral" depends on who financed the ESOP. ESOPs
funded by the employees through reduced compensation and benefits and which cost the
shareholders nothing are "shareholder neutral." Shamrock, 559 at 271. See also Grannis,
supra note 13, at 874.
'99 An ESOP is set up for a business purpose when the ESOP is created primarily to enhance
employee productivity by providing employees with ownership capital. Grannis, supranote
13, at 851.
200 Grannis, supra note 13, at 851 (writing that an ESOP is defensive when its purpose is to
help the corporation maintain control of the business by countering any hostile mergers).
201 A dilutive effect would occur if reductions in earnings per share would exceed earnings
on those shares. CANAN, supra note 31, at 164.
202 Shamrock Holdings, 559 A.2d at 27 1.
20
3 Id. at 272.
196

' 97
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noting that the ESOP plan allowed for confidential and mirrored voting.2" The
court proceeded to note that it found this anti-takeover nature nonthreatening to the
ESOP's fairness.2"5 Specifically, the court stated:
The evidence does establish that management has a leg up based
upon its easy access to the employees and their likely concern
about job security. However, there is no evidence that the ESOP
is a "lock-up" or that the leg up it gives management in any way
harms the company or its public stockholders. The ESOP may
mean that a potential acquiror will have to gain the employees'
confidence and support in order to be successful in its takeover
effort. However, there has been no showing that such support is or
would be impossible to obtain.2"6
Finally, the court stressed that the ESOP's dilutive effect was only speculative, due
to the absence of evidence of such an effect.2 °7
The court summarized its position, indicating that where employees fully
fund the ESOP and have independence in voting and tendering ESOP stock, the
ESOP usually, although not necessarily, will be considered fair.208 Other factors
such as when the ESOP was implemented, the plan terms, its nature, both business
and defensive,2 9 and its dilutive effect must also be considered.210

at 273.
Id. at 276.

0Id.
205

2o6ld. at 274.

207 Shamrock, 559 A.2d at 274-75.

Id. at 275. In its decision, the court mentioned the fact that the ESOP plan allowed for
both mirrored and directed voting. Surprisingly, the court appears to favor mirrored voting,
suggesting that mirrored voting makes a plan fairer than those without such a provision
because it gives employees control of all the ESOP stock, notjust the allocated shares. Many
courts and commentators disagree with this position, and argue that mirrored voting is the
single factor which makes an ESOP defensive because in the absence of such a provision,
management would have no way of putting such a large amount of shares in " friendly hands."
See, e.g., Grannis, supra note 13, at 882; NCR Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 497 (stating that "[i]f
the primary purpose of the ESOP is to provide employees with better benefits, there is no
need for the mirrored voting procedure."); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255,
264-65 (2d Cir. 1984); O'Toole, supra note 5, at 859.
209 The court noted, "[t]he fact that the ESOP was partly defensive, however, does not make
it unfair. This is a defensive device (assuming it is one) that is designed to and appears likely
to
add value to the company and all its stockholders." Shamrock, 559 A.2d at 276.
2 10
208

id.
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Comparatively, in NCR Corp., the Southern District Court of Ohio,
applying Maryland law, upheld AT&T's counterclaim that NCR's defensive ESOP
was invalid and unenforceable.2 1 ' The case arose when AT&T began a tender offer
in an attempt to obtain enough NCR stock to oust its Board. Subsequent to AT&T's
offer, NCR established a leveraged ESOP. AT&T claimed that the ESOP was
invalid, as it was a defensive attempt to entrench management and retain control of
the corporation. Unlike the Shamrock court who applied the Unocal test, the court
in NCR applied the primary purpose test set forth by the Maryland Court of Appeals
in Cummings v. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc.. 212 The primary purpose test
requires the court to assess the corporation's primary purpose in utilizing a
defensive measure in the context of a corporate takeover.213
In determining that NCR's ESOP was invalid and unenforceable, the court
considered the following factors, each of which the court stressed was not
dispositive in and of itself: (1) timing (i.e., the ESOP was established in the midst
of AT&T's tender offer); (2) the amount of initial stock issued to the ESOP; (3) the

211
212

NCR Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 476.
Cummings v. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc., 204 A.2d 795, 806 (Md. 1964).

Cummings articulated the primary purpose test as follows:
[W]here a good corporate purpose is being furthered and is the
principle motivation for an action by a board of directors, the fact that
the consummation of such transaction may have some effect on the
control of the corporation is immaterial and the agreement will stand
or fall depending on whether it is fair to the corporation.
Id.
213
NCR Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 495. The court in Mountain Manor Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri
expanded the primary purpose test to include a balancing test in the event that the defensive
measure had both the effect of entrenching management and also served a legitimate purpose.
NCR Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 495. Id. The Mountain Manor court articulated this balancing
test as follows:
[A]ssuming that the transaction is legal in all other respects ... the
court must look to see if there was any legitimate business purpose for
the transaction other than the self-interest of the directors. If it finds
such a purpose, under Cummings it would then have to determine
whether the independent purpose was a primary or principle one, or
whether conversely, the primary object was merely to manipulate
control. If the court finds that the transaction was, on the whole,
motivated by a legitimate corporate purpose, it should declare the sale
[of stock] to be valid; if it finds to the contrary -- that the purpose of
the transaction was primarily one of management's self-perpetuation
and that purpose outweighed any other legitimate business purpose -it should declare the sale to be invalid.
Mountain Manor v. Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri, 461 A.2d 45, 53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
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mirrored voting provision; (4) the ESOP's purpose evidenced by the context of the
Board's meetings; (5) the lack of opinion or input by the employee benefits
department; and (6) the nature of the preferred stock such that "no rational holder"
would vote against management.2 14
4. An Attempt at a Bright-Line Rule of Law
Shamrock and NCR are difficult to harmonize, as each applies different
standards from which to judge defensive ESOPs, and each arrives at different
conclusions. However, both decisions look to similar factors from which the courts
draw their conclusions and which may help future courts formulate a bright-line rule
to guide them in determining the validity of ESOPs created in the context of tender
offers. This article suggests such a rule.
This article proposes a two-prong test, entailing both subjective and
objective analyses. The test's first prong consists of a subjective analysis which
denotes safe harbor guidelines to which corporations can look before implementing
an ESOP. This "safe harbor test" secures the validity of potentially defensive
ESOPs by requiring that they exhibit certain attributes. These attributes are
borrowed from factors which either the Shamrock or NCR courts found relevant in
determining the validity of an ESOP created in the context of a tender offer. The
"safe harbor test" massages these factors into a workable rule of law. To pass the
"safe harbor test," an ESOP must have the following characteristics to be valid and
enforceable if challenged by a potential acquiror during a takeover battle:
(1) A least one year prior to a potential acquiring corporation
commencing a tender offer, the target corporation must have seriously
considered establishing an ESOP. The target corporation must produce
evidence that it intended to implement the ESOP, including, evidence
of board meetings held specifically to consider establishing an ESOP,
reports from both outside and internal consultants, such as financial
advisors, detailing the plan to the employer's specifications, and
documented input from general personnel and/or members of the
employee benefits department. 215
(2) The ESOP must be unleveraged. 1 6
214

NCR Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 496-99.

NCR Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 496 (reasoning that "[t]he timing of the ESOP is, in and of
itself, enough to raise an inference that it was motivated by a desire to perpetuate
management control.").
216 Grannis, supra note 13, at 861 (discussing the use of leveraged ESOPs as defensive
215
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(3) The ESOP must be "shareholder neutral. 2 17
(4) The ESOP may hold common stock only.21 8
(5) The ESOP may not have a mirrored voting provision.2 19
(6) The corporation
may issue only 5% of its stock at any one time to
220
the ESOP.
(7) The ESOP must be established for the primary purpose of
enhancing employee retirement benefits and not as an anti-takeover
device.
22
(8) The ESOP must not have a dilutive effect. '

Absent any of these characteristics, the ESOP will fail the "safe harbor test."
Nonetheless, the ESOP may still be enforceable under the second prong of the test -the objective "facts and circumstances" test.
The objective analysis assesses ESOPs on a case-by-case basis, looking to
all the relevant facts and circumstances to determine whether the ESOP should be
upheld. As Delaware law has been most persuasive in the area of corporate law,
this article suggests that all courts should apply the test articulated in Unocal (the
"Unocal Analysis") as a basis for the "facts and circumstances test". Under this
analysis, courts must ask the following two questions: (1) whether the directors had
"reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and

measures).
217 Shamrock, 559 A.2d at 271-72.
218 NCR Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 498-99 (holding that "preferred stock is structured in a
manner which virtually assures that no rational holder, fully appraised of the terms and
conditions of the preferred stock, will vote against the incumbent Board at the special
meeting.").
219 Id. at 497 (emphasizing that mirrored voting provisions are meaningless to a plan whose
purpose is to increase employee benefits because unallocated shares do not benefit present
employees). But see Shamrock, 559 A.2d at 275 (implying that ESOPs with mirrored voting
provisions are fairer than those without such a provision because they allow employees to
control all the ESOP stock).
220 NCR Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 497 (emphasizing that large initial stock issuances to an
ESOP creates the appearance that it was established to perpetuate management).
221

Shamrock, 559 A.2d at 271, 274-75 (noting the fairness of large ESOPs whose dilutive

effect is minimal (i.e., small reduction per share is necessary to adequately establish a plan
which consequently will increase productivity)).
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effectiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership;"222 and (2)
22 3
whether establishing the ESOP was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."
Indeed, management will argue that Unocal should not apply. 24
Management will assert that the ESOP's purpose is not defensive but has the
legitimate business purpose of increasing productivity and morale among the
employees, and thus, courts should give deference to management's decisions by
applying the business judgment rule. 5 In order to alleviate the conflicts incident
to defensive ESOPs, courts must look beyond management's empty assertions of
business purpose and independently evaluate the substance of the management's
decisions via the standards delineated in Unocal.
In answering the first question, courts must assess the make-up of the Board
to determine if a majority of the directors were disinterested. It should determine
whether those directors had a good faith basis for their decision to implement an
ESOP, and it should determine whether the directors reasonably investigated the
effects which the tender offer posed.226 If the court finds that a majority of
disinterested directors, in good faith, independently investigated the takeover
situation, the directors' burden of proving that they had "reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of
another person's stock ownership" will most likely be satisfied. 227 However, the
analysis does not end there.
Courts must also determine if the directors acted in the best interests of the
corporate shareholders by establishing an ESOP to defeat the perceived takeover
threat.228 Courts must examine the directors' motives to assess whether they were
motivated primarily to entrench management or if their motivation stemmed from

Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
But see Grannis, supra note 13, at 880 (suggesting a third step in the Unocal analysis
which would examine cost and attempt to determine the board's motives for implementing
a costly defense when a costless defense was available).
224 Grannis, supra note 13, at 878 (writing about management's probable response to avoid
application
of the Unocal standard).
22
5 Id. (noting the likelihood that management will attempt to have its decision to implement
and ESOP reviewed under the business judgment rule, thus, escaping the stricter standard
imposed by Unocal).
226 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (discussing the first part of the Unocal standard).
222

223 Id.

227 id.

228

Id. (holding that a "corporation does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived
threat by any Draconian means available.").
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a desire to protect the corporation and its stockholders.229 Unocal sets forth various
factors which help identify whether the adoption of an ESOP was "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed."
They include:
inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer,
questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies' other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and
the quality of securities being offered in the exchange, and the
shareholder interests at stake.23°
Thus, the courts must apply these factors to the facts and circumstances surrounding
each takeover proposal to determine whether implementing an ESOP was necessary
to fend off the threat or whether the directors could have utilized less evasive
means. 2 3' Based on the evaluation of the directors' motives and a review of the
factors listed above, courts can determine whether an ESOP was "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed."
If the ESOP fails both the "safe harbor test" and the "facts and
circumstances test," the court should invalidate the ESOP and render it
unenforceable. However, if an ESOP meets either test, courts would then apply the
business judgment rule and give deference to the board's decision to implement an
ESOP, even if, in hindsight, the ESOP proved to perpetuate management.
This article suggests that this two-part test is the best way to resolve the
conflicts of interest often times present when directors implement an ESOP during
the course of a tender offer. This approach would allow a court to more closely
scrutinize management's decision to implement an ESOP, and it would also provide
guidance to corporate directors so that they may better perform their fiduciary

229

Id.

210 Id. at 955-56.
231 Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334 (N.Y. 1975). In Schwartz, the court stressed:
[D]isturbance of equality of stock ownership in a corporation closely
held ... calls for special justification in the corporate interest; not
only must it be shown that it ... sought to achieve a bona fide
independent business objective, but as well that such objective could
not have been accomplished substantially as effectively by other
means which would not have disturbed proportionate stock
ownership.
Id. at 338.
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duties without the fear of limited liability.
IV. CONCLUSION

ESOP fiduciaries confront a vast array of potential conflicts of interest in
exercising their fiduciary duties, and contemporaneously, in attempting to comply
with ERISA. Tensions have flared between adopting a "hands off" judicial attitude
or requiring strict judicial review of fiduciary decisions on the issues of voting and
anti-takeover measures. The Department of Labor has skirted these issues
somewhat, leaving an already blurred area of law even more obscure. This article
suggests a simpler approach than those articulated by the Department of Labor and
the courts. Although this approach is not error free, in that it may be more costly
to administer and may require greater judicial supervision over the decisions of
ESOP fiduciaries, it provides the guidance lacking in the judicial opinions and
federal regulations which presently govern fiduciary conduct. Without the guidance
of a workable rule of law, ESOP fiduciaries will continue to act blindly,
perpetuating the uncertainties which plague this area of pension law.
Gina Marie Agresta-Richardson
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